MCP connection validation
Kirin inspects every MCP connection in real time and blocks rogue, misconfigured, or unapproved servers.
Cursor, Claude Code, Copilot, Windsurf, Codex. Kirin runs inside the agent and checks every action against your policy before it runs, while AgentMesh vets every skill, MCP server, and extension before it is installed.
Coding agents install packages, connect to MCP servers, run shell commands, and follow instructions buried in the files they read. EDR, DLP, and code scanners see the aftermath. Knostic sits inside the agent loop and decides before the action executes.
Every tool call is checked against policy before it runs. Allowed actions proceed, risky ones are blocked or routed to a human, and the same policy holds across every agent your developers use.
An agent asked to tidy stale data drops the live orders table, reports 'Command completed', and checkout starts throwing 500s.
Kirin denies the destructive command before it executes, tells the developer why, and logs a Prevented alert for the SOC.
A developer asks for a release-notes skill. The agent installs one whose SKILL.md carries a hidden instruction and ships ~/.aws/credentials off the machine.
AgentMesh scans skills, MCP servers, and extensions and marks each dangerous, risky, or clean. Kirin blocks the dangerous ones before they install.
Enforcement off, no CLAUDE.md. The agent goes straight to code: no permission check on the route, the caller's id concatenated into SQL, a malicious package and a vulnerable one in the install step. It ships anyway.
Enforcement on. The agent reads your coding rules, writes a STRIDE threat model, then codes: auth on the route, parameterised queries, ownership checked. The malicious install is blocked and the vulnerable one patched.
Claude Code, Cursor, and Copilot each expose agent autonomy, secrets, and MCP as different controls with different defaults. Nothing lines up and the values disagree.
One policy applied to every tool, with the same switches in shared columns. Change a setting once and it changes everywhere, with drift flagged.
Kirin inspects every MCP connection in real time and blocks rogue, misconfigured, or unapproved servers.
Hallucinated, vulnerable, or malicious packages are flagged before the agent installs them.
AgentMesh gives every skill, VS Code extension, and MCP server a verdict backed by scan findings.
Dangerous commands are blocked, downgraded, or routed to a human before they execute, inside the agent.
Insecure configuration changes across agents are flagged as they happen.
Blocked actions, drift, and vulnerabilities roll up into one dashboard and your SIEM.
Cursor, Claude Code, GitHub Copilot, Windsurf, Codex, JetBrains, Devin Desktop, and Gemini CLI, plus Claude Cowork through a plugin.
An MCP server runs with the agent's permissions. A misconfigured or malicious one is a hidden entry point into your repos, credentials, and internal systems. Kirin validates every connection and AgentMesh scans the servers themselves.
No. Kirin applies policy inside the agent and surfaces a clear, actionable reason when it blocks something. Developers keep working; only the risky action stops.
Those tools see files and processes after the fact. Knostic sees the agent's intent, the tool call, before it runs, and can stop it.